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Abstract This paper gives an introduction to the inter-
disciplinary special section. Against the historical and
ethical background of reproductive technologies, it ex-
plores future scenarios of human reproduction and ana-
lyzes ways of mutual engagement between fictional and
academic endeavors. The underlying idea is that we can
make use of human reproduction scenarios in at least
two ways: we can use them to critique technologies by
imagining terrible consequences for humanity but also
to defend positions that favor scientific and technolog-
ical development.
Keywords Human reproductive cloning . Genome
editing . Bioethics . Fiction . Narratives . History of
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The Special Section
This special section explores perspectives on new repro-
ductive technologies and genome editing from different
fields. In both, academic disciplines (such as bioethics)
and fictional narrations (such as literature and film) there
is great anticipation for these new technologies, but also
great concern. It is not always easy to determine what an
appropriate reaction to these technologies consists of,
because in both professional and popular discourses,
moral arguments are often intertwined with narratives
of hype and hope or utopian and dystopian scenarios.
The aim of our special issue is to deeply analyze such
intertwinements from a historical and systematic point
of view, and to find new ways of dealing with them.
Through a unique combination of philosophical inqui-
ry, socio-cultural contextualization, historical analysis,
and fictional storytelling, this special section maps out
the roots and consequences of discussions which started
with debates on eugenics, continued with human repro-
ductive cloning and –most recently – have been revived
through genome editing. The latter development has
initiated discussions that involved scientists themselves,
who must balance the technological promises against
intergenerational risks that arise from germline interven-
tions, or changes to the structure of society that might
lead to the stigmatization or social exclusion of people
affected by diseases or disabilities. From a historical
perspective we can see resemblances, as similar patterns
of arguments were triggered by earlier inventions. For
instance, the self-regulatory concern of science was al-
ready manifest during events such as the Asilomar con-
ference in 1975. In addition, arguments supporting a need
for regulating new avenues of human reproduction were
brought forward after events such as the births of Louise
Brown in 1978 and Dolly the Sheep in 1996.
While academic debates on these issues have had
their trends and turns – often followed by law and
policymaking –, science fiction has continuously
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brought individual and collective issues raised by these
technologies to public consciousness. Some films and
novels often counter scientific facts with stories of vul-
nerable and affected subjects that address potential risks
and side effects, while others explore the potential ben-
efits and transformative possibilities offered by possible
future biotechnologies. Even in the absence of an ex-
plicit reference to this genre, science fiction seems to be
embedded in moral reflection. For instance, some issues
that are at the core of bioethical debates remain sci-fi
scenarios: cloning a human embryo until full develop-
ment of an infant, gestating an infant in an artificial
environment outside a mother’s body, or manipulating
a child’s genome. The list of topics said to belong more
to ‘science fiction’ than to bioethics is much longer – it
includes human enhancement, extreme life extension,
brain transplantation, or even cryopreservation of a hu-
man body with the hope that resurrection may be possi-
ble in the future.
What is the role of speculation and anticipation when
we are discussing such future possibilities? On the one
hand, if bioethics deals too much with science fiction, it
might be accused of losing touch with reality. On the
other hand, if bioethics only focuses on the current state
of the art, bioethical deliberation may be too late to have
an impact before emerging technologies fully arrive.
From our point of view, such considerations raise more
than mere methodological or epistemic questions. They
touch upon moral questions embedded in every kind of
bioethical research: To whom do I pay my academic
attention? Which groups should I include in my analy-
sis? These questions are deeply intertwined with the
construction of futuristic narratives and scenarios, be-
cause such groups convey their own historical narratives
and perspectives on the respective moral issue. The
inclusion or exclusion of these perspectives is contin-
gent not only on everyday social practices and political
discourses, but also on the focus of academic endeavors.
The underlying idea of this special section is that we
can make use of future scenarios of human reproduction
in at least two ways: we can use them to critique technol-
ogies by imagining terrible consequences for humanity,
or to defend positions that favor scientific and technolog-
ical development. In both cases these scenarios are not
morally neutral; they are constructed based on premises,
perspectives, and narrative strategies that all take moral
(or social) stances. It is therefore vital to interrogate the
scenarios themselves, both in terms of technological fea-
sibility, and their underlying moral commitments.
Human Reproduction: Exploring Future Scenarios
It is certain that we are faced with technologies that are
expected to change human reproduction. Some people
anticipate that in the future reproduction and sexuality
might be separated even more than they are today, in an
era where birth control is in common use. It might be
possible for a child to be born without first passing
through fertilization, as some scholars emphasize with
reference to cloning, i.e. by transferring the nucleus
DNA of any somatic cell from a full-grown mammal
into an egg cell previously deprived of its nucleus DNA
[1–4]. The birth of the sheep Dolly makes it clear that, in
animals and under the right conditions, the somatic cells
of a body may be induced to develop [5–8] into new
individuals. The last 20 years have seen the birth by
somatic cloning of a large variety of animals, recently
even including monkeys [9, 10].1
Although reproductive cloning has so far only been
used on animals, it could also be employed for human
reproduction, e.g. to help those unable to have children
sexually or unwilling to turn to donors ([12], 357).
Attempting to do so today would be irresponsible, in
that cloned animals often display significant genetic
anomalies, die prematurely, or may have a life marked
by illness and suffering [11, 13, 14]. Yet tomorrow, as
some academic advocates of cloning argue, somatic
cloning could become as safe as any other reproductive
technique. If reproductive cloning were safe enough,
they speculate, it would even be preferred by a small
minority. Reproductive cloning could also be useful to
couples who want to have a biological child but do not
have usable gametes ([15], 503): if a man had no sperm
or his sperm was not fit for reproduction, he could still
father a child by fertilizing his partner’s egg cells with
the nuclear DNA of his somatic cell. Furthermore, clon-
ing would allow a lesbian couple to have a child without
having to resort to a sperm donor: to create an embryo it
would be sufficient to transfer the DNA of one partner
into the egg cell of the other ([16], 7) – the child would
have the nuclear DNA of the former and the
1 Year after year, we have seen a slow increase not only in the number
of species cloned but also the ability to produce embryos via cloning
and carry on their development up to birth. Dolly was the only animal
born from 277 embryos produced by transferring nucleus DNA (about
0,36%), whilst today the success rate of the intervention – defined as
the proportion of transferred embryos that reach birth – is around 2–3%
for all species considered. In cattle the average is far higher, oscillating
between 5 and 20%, whereas it is only around 6%, in pigs [11].
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mitochondrial DNA of the latter. Women could thus
have a child by themselves by combining one of their
skin cells with one of their unfertilized egg to be placed
back into their uterus ([17], 117).
Moreover, in the future, it may be possible to create
an embryo to use for reproduction through parthenogen-
esis, i.e. using an egg cell without the need for the
spermatozoid; electrically or chemically stimulating
the egg may be sufficient to it split like an embryo. To
date, unfertilized eggs have been used to obtain mouse,
rabbit, sheep, pig, bull and monkey embryos [18] – and
even human embryos (‘parthenotes’) [19]. However,
“(n)o one has been able successfully to make mammals
through parthenogenesis, or even get as far as establish-
ing a pregnancy. One common explanation is that, in
mammals, successful embryonic development may re-
quire some genes that have male imprinting” ([20],
134). So this research, at the moment, is speculative.
At the current state of development, the aim of re-
search on parthenogenesis is to isolate embryonic stem
cells, i.e. cells able to differentiate themselves into any
cell type [21–23]. We already know that gamete precur-
sors can be obtained from such embryonic stem cells
[24]. Now we know that the same result can also be
obtained starting from a somatic cell, through the crea-
tion of induced pluripotent stem cells (iPSCs) ([4, 25],
69). In this case, we face not so much speculation about,
as anticipation of, a new technology. The scenario in-
cludes the idea that every person could be fertile until
death [26] since they could always use in vitro or artifi-
cial gametes to reproduce. Today, after menopause,
women can only have a biological child if they have
frozen their egg cells, ovary tissue, or embryos. If it was
possible to produce in vitro gametes from somatic cells,
post-menopausal women would be able to have a bio-
logical child without prior planning [25, 27].
Moreover, this scenario includes the striking idea that
each of us could have gametes of both sexes, because
the egg cells could be obtained from male cells and
sperm from female cells [28, 29].2 This means that
same-sex couples could have children without needing
a gamete donor. Furthermore, women wanting to have a
child by themselves could use sperm produced from
their own somatic cells. Men could obtain the same
result as well; however, until there is artificial womb,
they would still need a woman to carry the pregnancy
for them. It is true that reproduction between close
relatives raises the risk of harmful genetic mutations
and consequently the risks will probably be greater if a
person reproduces with their own in vitro gametes [28].
Here, proponents argue that screening programs allow
the identification and rejection of embryos, or even just
the gametes, that display genetic anomalies [31].
Further, the use of in vitro gametes would let more
than two people have a biological child together, in that
two people may produce an embryo, develop embryonic
stem cells and then gametes usable to produce another
embryo with the gametes of a third person [32]. It has
been suggested that same-sex couples in particular may
have more chances to derive gametes from embryos that
were created by fertilization rather than through SCNT-
ESCs or iPSCs; a method which “is presumably less
complicated and less risky” ([33], 689). In that case, the
embryo would have the genetic traits of three people: If
Pablo and Maria produced an embryo, sperm could be
obtained from this embryo that could be used to produce
an embryo with Ingrid’s eggs. Thus, some would argue,
the baby would have the genes of Pablo, Maria and
Ingrid. Others would say that the baby has the genes
of Pablo and Maria’s embryo and Ingrid’s eggs. The
more people who are interested in having shared bio-
logical parenthood, the more times this intervention
would be repeated – at least theoretically, there is no
limit to the number of people who could be involved
([15, 29, 34, 35], 501–502).
For now, pregnancy can only occur in women’s
bodies. In the future, it might be possible to conceive
a human embryo in a laboratory and use an artificial
uterus to carry the embryo up to the birth of a new
individual. Although producing an artificial uterus
does not seem easy, some maintain that the difficulties
would not be insurmountable, and thus ectogenesis
could be a future option [36]. Researchers in some
countries, like the UK, are now able to grow a human
embryo in the laboratory up to the thirteenth day after
conception [37–39]. Technically, even growing it for
20 days would not be a problem. Legally, however,
researchers are not allowed to do this (due to the 14-
day rule of the Human Fertilization and Embryology
Authority, HFEA).
Already doctors have the ability to keep a prema-
turely born fetus alive from the 23rd week, although
in these cases the surviving child is rarely free from
serious brain damage. This means that in order for
an artificial uterus to carry a full-term pregnancy, the
2 Studies on animals show, for instance, that generation from two
female cells and two male cells is possible [30].
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time span between the thirteenth day and the 23rd
week currently represents the most difficult chal-
lenge. Artificial gestation could therefore come
about as result of gradual improvements in neonatal
intensive care [40]. Ectogenesis would ensure equal
opportunity in human reproduction [41]. Men could
also be free to have a child when they most pre-
ferred it, and women who preferred it could have a
child without being pregnant. There are couples who
consider pregnancy and birth to be a wonderful,
indispensable experience, whilst others would hap-
pily forego it, for example because they do not want
to experience months of nausea and insomnia or
change their lifestyle [42, 43].
Finally, today our genetic heritage is determined
by chance, but in the near future people may be able
to choose it. Genetic interventions in the develop-
ment of embryos could not only correct or prevent
significant genetic anomalies but also produce chil-
dren who are healthier and more resistant to disease.
Getting to this point would require experimenting on
embryos, which is still ethically and politically con-
troversial. However, should this technology become
safe and reliable, people could apply it successfully
every time they desire to reproduce [20]. With this
technology in particular, we are not talking about
science fiction scenarios but about future possibili-
ties that appear to be nearing: He Jiankui, a Chinese
scientist, has already claimed to have created the
first genetically edited children [44].
In its initial stages, human subject research on
germline genome editing could be aimed at the
development of interventions to prevent or reduce
the risk of transmitting genetic anomalies to off-
spring. For certain couples who cannot produce
healthy embryos, germline genome editing may be
the only way for them to avoid passing on genetic
disorders ([45], 500; [46, 47]).3 Yet as germline
genome editing techniques develop, some speculate
about the unprecedented chance to shape the genetic
code of children and eventually, influence the genet-
ic makeup of future generations ([20], 299; [49]).
People may then seek not only to correct but even to
enhance the genes of their future children.4
Proponents of pushing forward with such technolo-
gies, like He, argue that they could have potential posi-
tive impacts on the treatment of diseases, such as HIV.
However, as Savulescu and Singer [49] underline, this
attempt “was unethical, not because it involved gene
editing, but because it failed to conform to the basic
values and principles that govern all research involving
human participants”. This statement illustrates an impor-
tant, yet oftenmarginalized, point in debates on the future
of reproduction. When put into practice, these technolo-
gies need to be tested – and not only in animals but in
humans, involving clinical trials. However, in order to
proceed with such trials, researchers not only need to
ensure the consent of the subjects [55] but also demon-
strate that no less risky options for treatment exist [56].
With regard to some of these examples, particularly
those that venture into more speculative territory, the
question can be raised why some scholars continuously
devote their attention to technologies that are unlikely
ever to be included in clinical practice. From a critical
perspective that takes into account the function of such
narratives, the obvious hypothesis is the following: aca-
demic and fictional discourses not only offer a moral
perspective, they also deal with the ‘hype and hope’ of
these technologies garnering attention. Again, this desire
for attention and sensation might be inherently morally
problematic if it leads to skewed perspectives that prema-
turely welcome future technologies by ignoring the prac-
tical steps necessary to achieve safe procedures for those
affected and the consequences of failing to do so.
The Relationship between Bioethics and Science
Fiction
All the technologies described here share one important
feature: in nature, human reproduction occurs sexually,
3 Even now, a couple turning to an assisted reproduction intervention
may decide which embryo to give birth to, bearing in mind the results
of a prenatal genetic diagnosis on the fetus or preimplantation on the
embryo, hence assessing the genetic features of the embryos produced
in vitro [47]. This procedure is mainly offered when there is a risk of
transmitting serious genetic anomalies to the unborn child [16], but it
can also be used (for example in USA, Israel, Cyprus and Ukraine) to
select the sex of the future child for family balancing ([48], 77). A
couple, aware they could transmit genetic anomalies to the future child
and eager to avoid the risk of an abortion, could prefer to turn to
assisted reproduction involving PND and PGD.
4 In even more speculative discussions on moral enhancement,
scholars anticipate that physical and cognitive abilities of humans are
subject to fatigue. Empathy is particularly limited and mainly directed
towards those belonging to one's restricted circle [50, 51]. Natural
selection could of course lead here to changes as well , but
they could be obtained much faster by modifying or enhancing the
genome of future generations, as some scholars suggest [52–54].
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with the fertilization of the egg cell by the spermatozoid.
New reproductive technologies have already deeply
changed the idea of human reproduction, and the mere
fact that these technologies appear unnatural does not
provide sufficient reason to consider them unacceptable.
Adjectives like ‘unnatural’ are often thrown about to
denigrate those who are different and hardly ever help in
promoting deeper discussions. Although we often value
human nature for anthropological and moral reasons, in
democratic societies we usually also respect different
‘Menschenbilder’ (conceptions of humanity; more liter-
ally, ‘images of the human being’). Further, it is impos-
sible, to use the natural as the final criterion to discrim-
inate that which is ethically acceptable and that which is
clearly immoral. First, it is actually not so obvious that
new reproductive technologies are not natural, in that
the definition of what is natural and what is not is a
complex philosophical issue. As David Hume
remarked, if we define what is natural, we can consider
as natural “every event, which has ever happen’d in the
world, excepting those miracles, on which our religion
is founded” ([57], 304). But if we pit ‘natural’ against
what is rare and unusual, “and in this sense of the word,
which is the common one, there may often arise disputes
concerning what is natural or unnatural, and one may in
general affirm, that we are not possess’d of any precise
standard, by which these disputes can be decided” ([57],
304–5).
Today, we are amazed at the idea that tomorrow’s
children might be born from somatic cells (by cloning)
or in vitro gametes. In addition, the surprise is even
greater when they think that in the future children will
be born in artificial wombs and be subjected to genetic
engineering. Others reject from the same ideas. Indeed,
these scenarios above may foster fear because “every
thing that is unexpected affrights us. The suddenness
and strangeness of an appearance naturally excite a
commotion in the mind, like every thing for which
we are not prepar’d, and to which we are not
accustom’d” ([57], 285). Surprise is pleasurable in
itself, though, as Hume said, “it puts the spirits in
agitation, it not only augments our agreeable affec-
tions, but also our painful” ([57], 271). Furthermore,
worries regarding new reproductive technologies are
probably also based on a psychological tendency of
humans to prefer that which preserves the status quo
[58]. The “favourable prejudice towards the status quo
is endemic in human cognition” as Bostrom and Ord
[59] argue.
However, others argue that the status quo is already
inherently morally problematic and the challenges, thus,
will be increased by new technologies. They anticipate
that such technologies may not ameliorate but rather
magnify the problems of the status quo – whether in
terms of the inegalitarian social dynamics of reproduc-
tion or the failure of current societies to put into practice
ethical principles such as justice. It has been maintained,
for instance, that some reproductive technologies would
be incompatible with the principles of a liberal order and
would perpetuate social inequality [60]. Furthermore, it
has been argued that these technologies would vio-
late the basic right to having a non-manipulated
genetic heritage and condemn the person coming
into the world to live a life that others had already
lived or planned [61].
From this starting point, it can be said that there are
two different perspectives on the relationship between
ethics and speculative scenarios: a confirmative and a
critical perspective. Science fiction, as we understand it,
is one amongst many forms to dive into such specula-
tion. Accordingly, when using science fiction scenarios,
researchers make a choice between the confirmative and
the critical perspective.
On the one hand, science fiction may help us face
future reproductive scenarios by making them more
‘familiar’. After all, when something frequently repeats
itself, Hume wrote, the novelty fades [57]; passions
calm, agitation in the soul placates itself, and we observe
things much more peacefully. Thus, even if society
cannot accept new reproductive technologies overnight,
it is reasonable to assume that over time people will
grow accustomed to these new possibilities that are now
on the horizon and recognize, slowly but surely, their
value for humanity. From a perspective of science fic-
tion as confirmation, these stories can put us in a better
position to understand the advantages of new reproduc-
tive technologies more clearly and objectively. Georg
W.F. Hegel stated that philosophy is like the owl of
Minerva, which only takes flight when the day is over.
If we take this view seriously, philosophy should only
reflect on events and actions that have already occurred.
However, this might be too late. Looking ahead and
projecting ourselves into future scenarios is the task of
science fiction, which tries to foresee what is waiting on
the horizon. In this way, it reverses the classical hierar-
chy that sees literature as the handmaiden of serious
reflection; philosophical reflection often puts science
fiction writers in the position to imagine the moral
Nanoethics (2019) 13:199–207 203
implications emerging with new reproductive technolo-
gies [62]. However, moral and social issues that concern
these technologies are often first presented in science
fiction and only later discussed in philosophy [63].
On the other hand, science fiction may take the
position of critique, helping to construct a moral stand-
point regarding the impact of technology on our society
and on our lives that will sway our moral reflection. The
stories portrayed in films and novels replace hard scien-
tific facts with touching stories about individuals, with
all their vulnerabilities and hopes. Often in bioethical
reflection, the space for reasoning about individual and
concrete cases is too marginal to offer an exhaustive
picture of the situation lived by the characters described.
In the tradition of casuistry [64], science fiction can
provide a counter discourse to an exaggerated enthusi-
asm for reproductive technologies. The length of the
story allows the reader to get closer to the narrated
events, to have privileged access to the characters, and
to know their psychology and their motivations. In this
way, science fiction can also provide us with important
information on actual new technologies and the world
around us. But its value is in its ability to trigger our
empathy and imagine other lives, other ‘existences’.
These stories, through their social critique, are often
counter narratives, i.e., of opposition “not only to dom-
inant narratives, but also to prevailing modes of […]
thought and methods of research” ([65], 52). As Squier
has argued, as soon as technologies are “normalized”
and academics “lose awareness” ([66], 4) of them, sci-
ence fiction begins to embed them in stories of social
relationality and vulnerability. No other genre offers as
much imaginative leeway to portray confrontations with
new kinds of biotechnology and the beings that result
from it. Consequently, the genre is multiply intertwined
with ‘the ideology of progress’ ([67], 29). From a
cultural-historical perspective, it does not seem to be a
coincidence but rather a result of a deeply felt demand to
negotiate potential consequences, side effects, and risks
that, especially in such a technically highly advanced
culture, technical progress is fictionally reshaped and
thereby processed. Notably, the UK is not only famous
for the tradition of scientific experiments but also for its
variations of utopias and science fiction, such as Mary
Shelley’s Frankenstein (1818) or Aldous Huxley’s
Brave New World (1932), to name but two prominent
examples. Technologies such as IVF and mammalian
cloning were developed in Britain, in the cultural con-
text in which debates about the future of human
reproduction were first explored by scientists, novelists,
and public intellectuals.
Mutual Invitations of Academic and Fictional
Debates
Clearly, the relationship between bioethics and science
fiction is complex. Science fiction can contribute to
confirming our hopes about new reproductive technol-
ogies. It can help us overcome significant, deeply rooted
prejudices and enable us to grow accustomed to future
scenarios. But literary discourse can also construct nar-
ratives based on different moral premises. For example,
it can point out that not everyone will equally profit
from the scientific achievements presented in these sce-
narios. In both cases, science fiction can contribute to
bioethical discourses with new perspectives and argu-
ments. Such stories give us privileged access to the
world of tomorrow, with the closeness and focus on
subjectivity found in science fiction. Nevertheless, such
stories are not morally neutral. On the contrary, they are
inherent to moral discourses.
This special section has invited scholars from various
fields to ‘tell their stories’ – to give their perspectives on
new reproductive technologies relative to their back-
grounds. It features four Original Research Papers (by
Robert Ranisch, Oliver Feeney, Aline Ferreira and one
co-authored by Fabrizio Rufo and Antonella Ficorilli),
two Discussion Notes (by Ari Schick and Mirko
Garasic), and two Art-and-Science Interaction articles
(one co-authored by Julia Diekämper and Solveig Lena
Hansen, and the English translation of a short story by
Francesco Verso).5
Robert Ranisch’s paper, entitled ‘Eugenics is back’?
Historic References in Current Discussions of Germline
Gene Editing traces the history of eugenics in relation to
the present discourse on germline genome editing. It
identifies seven variants of eugenics arguments in bio-
ethics and analyzes how scholars make use of narratives
of the past to justify their positions in the present. The
articles concludes that references to the eugenic past
used to rebut gene editing are highly selective and
should be abandoned in favor of a more scientific and
transparent discourse.
5 The special section is an outcome of our conference ‘What’s Next?’.
Hype and Hope from Human Reproductive Cloning to Genome
Editing, kindly supported and funded by the Andrea von Braun
Stiftung, Munich, Germany.
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Fabrizio Rufo and Antonella Ficorilli do not go back
as far in history as the beginning of eugenics, but they
also feature a historical storyline. In their paper, From
Asilomar to Genome Editing: Research Ethics and
Models of Decision, they compare the 1975 Asilomar
conference on recombinant DNAwith the 2015 confer-
ence in Napa on human germline engineering and
events following this conference. They observe three
shifts that have occurred over those forty years: First,
biology as a discipline of observation has transformed
into biology as intervention. Second, the awareness
amongst scientists that they need to discuss moral ques-
tions, risks and consequences of their research, has
risen. Third, the process of discussion and deliberation
has moved from a hierarchical approach to a reticular
conception of knowledge.
Also taking a comparative perspective, Oliver
Feeney’s article Editing the Gene-Editing Debate: Re-
Assessing the Normative Discussions on Emerging Ge-
netic Technologies analyses the mapping of the human
genome in relationship to recent discussions on
CRISPR-Cas9. From a critical perspective, the paper
states that dominant normative frameworks (in acade-
mia and policy) are insufficient for evaluating new
technologies such as CRISPR. They often build on
misleading genetic essentialist assumptions and try to
find answers to questions that are too abstract and spec-
ulative, such as human enhancements. Accordingly,
Feeney advocates for a reframing of the debate and
policy with more sociological insight.
The contribution by Aline Ferreira, entitled New
Bodies, New Identities? The Negotiation of Cloning
Technologies in Young Adult Fiction analyzes reproduc-
tive cloning in young adult fiction. Comparing literary
and academic discourses, the paper analyzes the idea of
cloned bodies for ‘housing’ the consciousness of per-
sons for the aim of therapy and life extension. The paper
argues that speculative bioethics should start to take
these literary perspectives into account because these
novels and films point out the uniqueness of clones,
depicting them as usual humans in search of an identity.
Mirko Garasic’s Discussion Note, Altered Mortality:
Why the Quest for Immortality is Regaining Visibility in
the Media also focuses on the notion of separation of
body and consciousness. It analyzes the TV series Al-
tered Carbon in relation to a ‘quasi-manifesto’ on head
transplants in 2017. It points out how an announced
scientific experiment and the cinematographic discourse
are interlinked, and concludes that in this case, the
fictional series serves to confirm the expert discourse.
Against the background of hyper-individualism, the dis-
cussion note critically argues mortality should be taken
into account in collective discussions.
Ari Schick’s Discussion Note,What Counts as ‘Suc-
cess’ in Speculative and Anticipatory Ethics? Lessons
from the Advent of Germline Gene Editing critically asks
how we should (and should not) pursue speculative
ethics. Taking genetic engineering as an example, the
commentary notes the transition from the ‘speculative’
mode of early bioethics to the ‘anticipatory’ turn of the
1990s. Attempting to continually move the focus on the
discourse on genetic engineering ahead, absent signifi-
cant developments in clinical applications, Schick ar-
gues, risks not providing a particularly useful anticipa-
tory evaluation of future technologies and may under-
mine existing norms long before a broad consensus
would justify moving beyond them.
Julia Diekämper’s and Solveig Lena Hansen’s Art-
and-Science Interaction article, entitled Hype, Hope,
and Help: Situating a Science Announcement in a Web
of Stories, analyzes He Jiankui’s announcement of Lulu
and Nana. Against the background of literary and cul-
tural theories, the analysis compares this medial
YouTube-story with narratives employed in fictional
stories. Because no other sources are yet available –
such as raw genetic data, peer review publications, or
testimony from the parents – his story actually performs
the evidence of its own success through a narrative
stance that exposes itself as highly self-centered.
Finally, Francesco Verso’s short story Two Worlds, the
second Art-and-Science Interaction article in this issue,
provides a fictional contribution to the special section. In
his scenario, genetic engineering has been widely pur-
sued on Earth, resulting in chimeras. Paralleling this, the
story describes the consequences of climate change in the
future and how new species try to recolonize Earth with a
diversity of florae. As so many science fiction scenarios,
this can be read not only as an extrapolation into the
future but as a comment on the present – in this case
the debate on climate change.
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